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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 21-1580
__________
MERSADIES BONILLA,
Appellant
v.
AMERICAN HERITAGE FEDERAL CREDIT UNION
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2-20-cv-02276)
District Judge: Honorable Mark A. Kearney
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
August 12, 2021
Before: JORDAN, MATEY and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: August 16, 2021)
___________
OPINION*
___________
PER CURIAM

*

This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.

Pro se appellant Mersadies Bonilla appeals from the District Court’s order
granting defendant American Heritage Federal Credit Union’s motion for summary
judgment and denying her motion for summary judgment. For the following reasons, we
will affirm the District Court’s judgment.
I.
As we write primarily for the parties, who are familiar with the facts, we will
discuss the details only as they are relevant to our analysis. In 2016, someone transferred
several thousand dollars into Bonilla’s accounts at American Heritage Federal Credit
Union from the account of another Credit Union shareholder. The Credit Union believed
this transfer was fraudulent and reversed the payment, which left Bonilla’s accounts with
negative balances. The Credit Union began reporting these negative balances to credit
reporting agencies.
After the Credit Union reported the suspected fraud, the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania brought criminal charges against Bonilla regarding the transfer of funds.1
In July 2019, the Commonwealth attempted to file a motion to nolle pros the charges.
Due to administrative confusion, no motion was docketed and the charges remained
pending until March 2020, when the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas granted the

1

While those charges were pending, Bonilla filed a federal lawsuit against the Credit
Union alleging violations of federal consumer protection and banking statutes. The
District Court ultimately granted the Credit Union’s motion for judgment on the
pleadings, and Bonilla did not appeal. See Bonilla v. Am. Heritage Fed. Credit Union,
No. 2:18-cv-03293, 2019 WL 1506012 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 4, 2019).
2

Commonwealth’s motion to nolle pros the charges at a status hearing. In April 2020, the
Credit Union ceased reporting the negative balances to credit reporting agencies.
That month, Bonilla filed two complaints, one in federal court and one in state
court. In both complaints, Bonilla brought claims against the Credit Union and three
individual employees of the Credit Union for alleged violations of state and federal laws. 2
Since Bonilla filed her federal complaint in forma pauperis, the District Court screened it
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). After permitting an amendment, the District
Court ruled that Bonilla stated a claim under the Fair Credit Reporting Act but failed to
state a claim under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, Truth in Lending Act, or state
law. Bonilla v. Am. Heritage Fed. Credit Union, No. 2:20-cv-2053, 2020 WL 2539197
(E.D. Pa. May 19, 2020).
The defendants removed the state-filed case to federal court, and, with Bonilla’s
consent, the District Court consolidated the two cases. The District Court granted the
defendants’ motion to dismiss the removed complaint and gave Bonilla leave to file an
amended complaint addressing both the Fair Credit Reporting Act claim and the
deficiencies in her state claims. Bonilla filed a first amended complaint, and the
defendants again moved to dismiss. The District Court granted the motion in part and
determined that Bonilla stated only a claim against the Credit Union under the Fair Credit
Reporting Act. The District Court dismissed without prejudice Bonilla’s claims against

2

The federal complaint focused on the alleged violations of federal law and the state
complaint on alleged violations of state law, but both complaints alleged both types of
violations.
3

the individual defendants, claims under Pennsylvania law, and renewed efforts to bring
other federal statutory claims. Mem., ECF No. 16, & Order, ECF No. 17.
After the Credit Union answered the First Amended Complaint and Bonilla
unsuccessfully moved for summary judgment, Bonilla sought leave to amend her
complaint, based on discovery, to seek punitive damages for willful violation of the Fair
Credit Reporting Act.3 The District Court denied without prejudice this first motion,
which did not include a proposed Second Amended Complaint. Bonilla filed a second
motion to amend, attaching a proposed Second Amended Complaint asserting claims
against the Credit Union under the Fair Credit Reporting Act (including punitive
damages), Truth in Lending Act, Regulation Z, and Electronic Fund Transfer Act, but
without any Pennsylvania law claims. The District Court explained that Bonilla failed to
justify including the twice-dismissed Truth in Lending Act, Regulation Z, and Electronic
Fund Transfer Act claims and denied her motion without prejudice to moving to amend
“by showing good cause to add punitive damages alone or otherwise asserting claims
consistent with [the District Court’s] earlier Orders.” Order, ECF No. 29.
Bonilla filed a third motion to amend with a proposed amended complaint
containing only the Fair Credit Reporting Act claim and related claim for punitive

Each of Bonilla’s motions to amend requested “leave to supplement her first amended
complaint according to Rule 15(a)(2).” ECF Nos. 26, 28, 30. Bonilla did not cite Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 15(d), allege any new transactions, occurrences, or events within
the meaning of that provision, or otherwise refer to supplementation in her motions. She
thus moved to amend, not merely to supplement. Cf. Lewis v. Att’y Gen., 878 F.2d 714,
722 n.20 (3d Cir. 1989) (explaining that a pro se pleading must be “judged by its
substance rather than according to its form or label”) (citation omitted).
3
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damages. The District Court granted this motion in part and denied in part, rejecting
Bonilla’s inclusion, in her prayer for relief, of a request for a declaration that her rights
under the United States Constitution had been violated. With that request removed,
Bonilla filed her Second Amended Complaint and the Credit Union answered.
After discovery, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The
District Court granted the Credit Union’s motion and denied Bonilla’s motion. Mem.,
ECF No. 58. Bonilla appealed.4
II.
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise plenary review over a
grant of summary judgment, applying the same standard that the District Court applies.
Barna v. Bd. of Sch. Dirs. of Panther Valley Sch. Dist., 877 F.3d 136, 141 (3d Cir. 2017).
Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute
as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(a). Although “[w]e view the facts and draw all reasonable inferences in the
non-movant’s favor,” we will conclude that “[a] disputed issue is ‘genuine’ only if there
is a sufficient evidentiary basis on which a reasonable jury could find for the non-moving
party.” Resch v. Krapf’s Coaches, Inc., 785 F.3d 869, 871 n.3 (3d Cir. 2015) (citation
and quotation marks omitted).

4

Bonilla did not name the previously dismissed individual defendants in her notice of
appeal and does not argue on appeal that her claims against those defendants should be
revived.
5

III.
First, we address the scope of this appeal. Bonilla primarily argues that the
District Court erred in dismissing her fraud claim against the Credit Union under
Pennsylvania law. She contends that the District Court improperly focused on intentional
fraud and overlooked Pennsylvania case law finding liability for negligent or innocent
misrepresentations. But Bonilla’s operative pleading is the Second Amended Complaint,
and it does not contain any Pennsylvania law claims. In general, an amended pleading
“supersedes the earlier pleading and renders the original pleading a nullity.” Palakovic v.
Wetzel, 854 F.3d 209, 221 (3d Cir. 2017). The failure to include a dismissed claim in an
amended pleading constitutes a waiver of the right to challenge that claim on appeal
unless repleading the particular cause of action would have been futile. United States ex
rel. Atkinson v. Pa. Shipbuilding Co., 473 F.3d 506, 516 (3d Cir. 2007). “Repleading is
futile when the dismissal was ‘on the merits,’” which is “when it is with prejudice or
based on some legal barrier other than want of specificity or particularity.” Id.
The District Court dismissed Bonilla’s fraud claim because she failed to identify
any misrepresentation that the Credit Union made to her upon which she justifiably
relied. This dismissal was based on factual insufficiency and was explicitly without
prejudice. Bonilla did not include any fraud claim in any draft of the Second Amended
Complaint, even when she included several previously dismissed statutory claims, and
never specifically asserted claims for negligent or innocent misrepresentation. She also
did not take any affirmative action to preserve the dismissed fraud claim for appellate
review, such as filing a notice with the District Court. Atkinson, 473 F.3d at 517. Under
6

these circumstances, repleading was not futile and Bonilla has waived her right to
challenge the District Court’s dismissal of her fraud claim.5
Aside from her arguments about her fraud claim, Bonilla contends that the District
Court erred in its summary judgment analysis of her Fair Credit Reporting Act claim.6
She maintains that the Credit Union violated its statutory duty to investigate and implies
that Pennsylvania’s doctrines of negligent and innocent misrepresentation impact the
scope of this duty. Those doctrines do not aid Bonilla and, in any case, do not determine
the reasonableness of an investigation under the Fair Credit Reporting Act. See Seamans
v. Temple Univ., 744 F.3d 853, 864-65 (3d Cir. 2014) (explaining the reasonableness
standard). Bonilla also makes several factual arguments, albeit without explanation of

5

If we were to review the dismissal, we would conclude that the District Court did not
err. Bonilla focuses on intentionality, but the District Court dismissed her claim based on
other elements of fraud. Bonilla failed to allege that she justifiably relied on a
misrepresentation, as required to state a claim for intentional, negligent, or innocent
misrepresentation under Pennsylvania law. See Bortz v. Noon, 729 A.2d 555, 560-61
(Pa. 1999). And the doctrine of innocent misrepresentation is limited to claims seeking
recission in the real estate context. Id. at 61. Bonilla based her claim on alleged
misrepresentations made to credit reporting agencies, but she does not cite, and we are
not aware of, any Pennsylvania authority permitting a claim for intentional or negligent
misrepresentation where the plaintiff’s injury did not result from the plaintiff’s own
justifiable reliance. See Feudale v. Aqua Pennsylvania, Inc., 122 A.3d 462, 466 n.5 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 2015) (“[The plaintiff] does not cite, and we are unaware of, any authority
which would allow a third party to recover for a misrepresentation made to and relied
upon by another party.”).
6

In her appellate brief, Bonilla claims in passing that the Credit Union violated the Truth
in Lending Act. Even if this claim is not waived by Bonilla’s failure to include it in the
Second Amended Complaint, she provides no substantive argument about the District
Court’s dismissal of that claim and thus forfeits the issue. See N.J. Dep’t of Env’t Prot.
v. Am. Thermoplastics Corp., 974 F.3d 486, 492 n.2 (3d Cir. 2020).
7

how they are material to her claim. We conclude that there is no genuine issue of
material fact concerning whether the Credit Union conducted reasonable investigations of
Bonilla’s disputes in 2019 and 2020, for substantially the same reasons given by the
District Court. We will thus affirm the District Court’s grant of the Credit Union’s
motion for summary judgment and its denial of Bonilla’s motion for summary judgment.
IV.
Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.
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